Moral Principles and the Evolution of a Moral Sense

Dennis Werner

ABSTRACT

            Scholars often confuse descriptions or explanations of what is with judgments about what ought to be. The naturalistic, relativistic and moralistic fallacies which derive from this confusion have been particularly common when evaluating theories about the evolution of morality. This review examines aspects of our moral sense that evolved from the altruism common to kin groups and from the accommodation to dominance hierarchies and reciprocity typical in larger groupings.  Many empirical studies show how we need to be wary of our innate sense of morality. In particular, our moral indignation and sense of justice mostly reflect concern with our place in the status hierarchy rather than legitimate moral concerns.

A moral system based on the principle of increasing "well-being," rather than "justice" permits us to use empirical research to uncover the best ways to increase well-being. It also avoids the dependency on free will important to other moral systems, and so permits a more deterministic-scientific view of human nature. These themes in moral philosophy are at least as old as the Protestant Reformation.

KEY WORDS: evolution of morality; moral indignation; altruism; reciprocity; justice; Protestant Reformation

The origin of a moral sense is probably the most polemic topic in all of the literature on evolution. In “The Descent of Man” Darwin (1998/1874) explained that “any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well, or nearly as well developed, as in man.” Already in his time such reflections provoked vehement protests. In a letter to Darwin, the Reverend Leonard Jenyns affirmed that he could not believe that “man’s reasoning capacities, and especially his moral sense might have been acquired from irrational progenitors, or from natural selection. This seems to eliminate totally the Divine Image that constitutes the insurmountable distinction between Man and Animals” (cited in Uchii, 1996).  Almost a century and a half later, the polemic continues. An internet search for the expression “moral evolution” turned up thousands of pages, most written by people indignant about the attempt by evolutionists to explain morality. For example, Raymond Bohlin, a Ph.D. in molecular biology, and organizer of “Creation, Evolution and Modern Science,” argues that the idea of moral evolution can only lead to “despair, negation or irrational hope,” since it implies there is no meaning to life outside the demands of biology (Bohlin 2003). In the vast majority of cases, authors affirm that only God, or a Divine Force, could account for morality.

The core of the debate centers on an old theme in moral philosophy summed up by Hume in the idea of the insurmountability of the gap between “is” and “ought”. Since this distinction is so important, it is important to examine some of its ramifications.

Is and ought

Elsewhere (Werner 1999a; 1999b) I distinguished three “fallacies” that result from the confusion between “is” and “ought”. They are: 1) the naturalistic fallacy, 2) the relativistic fallacy, and 3) the moralistic fallacy. In the naturalistic fallacy one concludes that, if something in fact exists in nature (i.e., is “natural”) then it must be considered “good.”  This fallacy comes in at least two versions. In the simplest version one concludes that we ought to follow the “laws of nature,” and not what comes from artificial human intervention. Normally those who adopt this position believe that nature is good and does good. But some people, even while recognizing that nature is sometimes cruel, still think we ought to follow its rules. This was the case of the Marquis de Sade (perhaps satirizing the ideas of thinkers like Rousseau), and more recently by great business leaders like Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller. As Rockefeller preached in his Sunday school classes: “The growth of big business is just the survival of the fittest. This is not an evil tendency of business. It is simply the carrying out a law of nature and a law of God” (cited in Rachels, 1991). In the middle of the twentieth century intellectuals like Georges Bataille (1949) praised the “good” side of nature’s cruelties. Of course many disagree with this vision. As commented by Katherine Hepburn, in her role as a missionary in the African Queen, “Nature is what we were put on earth to overcome.”

In another version of the naturalistic fallacy one concludes that we ought to follow the dictates of our own human nature. For example, we ought to search within ourselves the basis for good and justice. Some recent evolutionists have adopted one version or the other of this type of argument. They suggest, like Darwin, that the demands of group life have created a moral sense in humans, but go beyond this statement about what “is” to conclude that the moral sense that we in fact have, at least in its most evolved sense, is the moral sense that we “ought” to have (Wilson 1998). For example, Bromberg (2003) suggests that the meaning of the word “good” evolved from more specific “concrete” meanings given to more general abstract meanings, and that this, in fact, “is” and is what “ought to be” our basic moral sense. In this way he believes that we can find in biology an objective basis for our morality. Other theoreticians search for this basis in the universal agreement among human beings about what our moral sense ought to be. For Wilson (1998) what ought to be “is a translation, not of human nature, but of the public will, which can become ever wiser and more stable through an understanding of the needs and weaknesses of human nature.” This view of Wilson is similar to that of Durkheim (1915) for whom we also find in group life, the only force larger than the individual which can anchor our moral system. But while Durkheim emphasizes cultural differences and varied moral systems, Wilson, like most evolutionists, seeks universal principles. To be valid, Wilson’s “consensus” could have no exceptions. Otherwise we fall into the negative side of group solidarity – xenophobia.

These latter reflections take us to the distinction between “objective” (or “transcendental”) morality based on something external to humans (like God), and a “subjective” (or “empirical”) morality based on human consciousness. For many religious people “subjective” morality is empty, and anchorless. Only a God could provide a real foundation for objective morality. In their attempts to anchor objective morality on biology (and more specifically on group life), evolutionists still need to clarify why they accept the dictates of group life as the foundation for morality, and not other aspects of biology. Accepting universal agreement as a basis for morality does not solve the problem, since everyone may be morally wrong, and it is still not clear who (which species for example) ought to be included in this agreement! (Bohlin 2003).

These religious critiques are welcome, but their answer – only God can give us objectivity – does not solve the problem either. Like many people, I accept, for reasons that I cannot justify, that the basic principle of morality is “do good, in the sense of increasing well-being in a sustainable way.” In the case of a God whose main commandment is “do good” or “love your neighbor as yourself” there would be no problem, but if God wanted people to harm each other and rewarded this type of behavior, then I think it would be morally correct to disobey His will, and do all we can to fight it. In my view, doing something just because we can win a divine prize or avoid a divine punishment is not necessarily moral behavior. In the final analysis, obeying the “laws of nature” or the “laws of God” involves the same problem. These laws may be followed when they increase well-being, but not when they increase affliction or adversity. Consider the case of Jacob in the Old Testament. He committed what today would be considered serious crimes -- extortion, identity fraud, embezzlement, and war crimes – all of which caused harm to others. Yet his God rewarded this selfish, harmful behavior by making his many sons the founders of the twelve tribes of Israel (Jacob’s new name). It is hard not to see in this God something similar to natural selection at its most brutish level. The insurmountability of going from “is” to “ought” continues, even when trying to put God in the middle.

Unable to base morality on nature, other thinkers have recourse to the “relativistic fallacy” in which one concludes that if a culture in fact has a given moral system, then this is the system it “ought” to have. This position is even more difficult to uphold, since it leads to insoluble conflicts between cultures with different moral systems. In addition it cannot deal with culture change, or with differences of opinion within the same culture.

For some, the difficulty of finding an objective basis for morality leads to the conclusion that morality simply does not exist or does not matter. This position, known as “moral nihilism” leads to other problems. We cannot avoid thinking about what we “ought” to do, since every decision we make depends on this. It seems we have an irresistible tendency to confuse what “is” with what “ought to be.” Observe, for example, the ease with which we pass from a statement about what is to a statement about morality when we talk about causes. We say “A causes B” (a simple statement about what is), to “A is responsible for B” to “A is to be blamed for B” (a moral affirmation). Even our basic vocabulary confuses “is” with “ought.” The words “right” and “wrong,” for example, can refer both to simple statements of fact (like answers on a multiple choice test), and to moral statements. This tendency is so strong that we make the transition between “is” and “ought” without noticing it. No wonder, then, that we sometimes also go from what “ought to be” to what “is.” This passage is known as the “moralistic fallacy.” We often come across it in academic discourse when people argue, for example, that men and women ought to be equal, and conclude from this that they are in fact equal (and woe to anyone who thinks otherwise), or when people argue that people “ought to be altruistic,” therefore they “are” altruistic. We need to be constantly reminded that “explanation” is not “justification” and vice-versa.

In view of the difficulty in finding an objective basis for morality, I think it best to approach evolutionary theories in the same way we approach other scientific theories about morality (for example, those of  developmental psychologists) as attempts to describe and explain our moral systems, not as attempts to justify these systems.

Basic Concepts for an evolutionary explanation of morality

Following Darwin, most evolutionists have sought explanations for our moral sense in the evolution of group life. Depending on what they want to explain, researchers have emphasized the impact of 1) kin groups, 2) groups of non-kin characterized by reciprocity, and 3) groups of non-kin characterized by dominance hierarchies. Together with group life, Darwin and recent researchers have also emphasized the importance of the development of cognitive capacities.

Kin groups – altruism, empathy and sympathy

In Darwin’s day, one of the greatest riddles for the theory of natural selection was the evidence that some animals were willing to sacrifice their own lives and their own reproductive potential for the good of others. If such animals are unable to reproduce, how is it that their altruistic characteristics continue in future generations? The answer came with the idea of “kin selection” or “selfish gene” (Hamilton 1963; Dawkins 1976). An individual might indeed be altruistic, but its genes, found also in its relatives, might be “selfish.” What is important for natural selection is the continuation of genes, not individuals (who always die). This would explain why some insects sacrifice themselves for the good of the hive. For example, some worker wasps have more genes in common with their sisters than they would with their own offspring. Such a wasp would pass on more genes to the future by sacrificing herself to save her queen mother (who will produce more sisters) than by saving herself (Wilson 1980, p. 193-196).

Although many people might classify such acts as amoral reflexes, Darwin (1998/1874) argued that it would be difficult to make a clear distinction between such reflexes and acts that resulted from a more deliberate consciousness. Defining a moral being as one “capable of comparing past and future motivations or acts, and approving or disapproving of these acts,” Darwin clarified that there was no reason to believe that a lower animal would have this capacity. Still, he emphasized that many human motivations and acts do not permit us to distinguish between instinctive reflexes and acts carried out with deliberation. For example, the ability to feel sympathy in many species probably originated in the relations between parents and offspring, and it is these feelings that would begin the journey toward a moral sense. It is difficult to know in human beings how many of their moral acts arise from unreflected sympathy and how many from more conscious deliberation.

In any case, more systematic research has revealed a clear bias among humans to behave more “altruistically” in situations that result in the passing on of one’s own genes. For example, many times mothers sacrifice the satisfaction of their own hunger to care for their offspring – which seems to be the case in many animals and among humans (Daly and Wilson 1988; Wallace 1979). In addition, comparative studies (Taiwan versus U.S.A. for example) show that people give practically the same preference for close relatives when they must choose who to save in moral dilemmas, even when these dilemmas involve complicating factors like “different numbers of victims,” “relative status of victims,” “contractual acceptance of risk,” or “the possibility of not acting” (O’Neill and Petrinovish 1998).

The predictions regarding altruism can be much more subtle. For example, Euler and Weitzel (1999) asked German grandchildren which of their grandparents was most caring. Independently of geographical distances or ages, grandchildren were most likely to cite maternal grandmothers. The paternal grandfathers were considered least caring. The authors argue that this is explainable by the problem of paternal uncertainty, i.e. mothers always know who their real children are, fathers sometimes have doubts. Maternal grandmothers are very sure that their grandchildren are really theirs. Paternal grandfathers may have doubts regarding both their own children, and their son’s children. Wright (1996) cites numerous studies showing agreement of the data with different variations on the same logic of paternal investment. To cite just one example, the degree of grief felt by parents who have lost a child is strictly related to the efforts invested in them. The death of adolescent children, for example, causes more grief that the death of younger children. Adolescents have received more investment, but have not yet given returns in terms of grandchildren (Crawford, Salter and Lang 1989 – cited in Wright 1996).

This same kinship logic also explains sources of conflict between different people. For example, although in general mothers and their children share the same interests (in terms of passing on genes), there are moments in the life cycle when interests diverge. The divergences can begin during gestation. Normally morning sickness during the first weeks of pregnancy is adaptive, since it makes mothers avoid eating foods with toxins that could harm the fetus during this delicate period. The proof of this is that mothers without morning sickness suffer more miscarriages and bear more deficient children than mothers with morning sickness (Profet 1992). But when the mother’s health is seriously harmed by this nausea, a conflict of interest occurs. The fetus has mechanisms to provoke sickness that would not be good for the mother. Other moments of conflict occur when new children are born, when mothers need to choose between caring for a sick child or a healthier one, or when young mothers marry other men. The conflicts between mother and child diminish for older mothers. This is because older mothers have fewer chances to bear other children, and so profit more (in terms of passing on genes) by caring for the children they already have. Indeed, Wallace (1979) cites evidence that it is older mothers who must dedicate themselves to their children, and Daly and Wilson (1988) showed for various societies that the probability of a mother’s committing infanticide goes down with her age.

Kinship is also important in explaining harmful acts to others. For example, Daly and Wilson (1988) showed that in all human societies studied so far a contact with a non-relative is more likely to lead to homicide than a contact with a relative. This also applies to the case of step mothers and step fathers in comparison with mothers and fathers. Within families the vast majority of homicides occur between husband and wife (who may have some common genetic interests – their children) but who do not share genes themselves. In addition, although the likelihood that fathers will kill their sons diminishes with age, it does not diminish as much as in the case of mothers. According to the researchers, this is because older men still stand a chance of reproducing, while older women do not. Normally, older sons are more problematic for fathers, and in fact are more likely to be killed by step fathers or step mothers than are younger sons. However, in the case of biological fathers and mothers, older sons represent a greater biological investment than younger sons. After all, older sons received more attention and are on the verge of beginning to produce grandchildren. No wonder, then, that biological fathers are more inhibited about killing an older son, and in fact (contrary to the case with step fathers) biological fathers are more likely to kill a younger than an older son.  There are still other correlations: It seems biological fathers inhibit themselves more than do their sons when conflicts arise. Older sons (above 16 years of age) are more likely to kill their fathers than the fathers are to kill their sons. Daly and Wilson argue that in these cases fathers have a greater interest in keeping their sons alive (and reproducing) than sons have in seeing their fathers alive. But step fathers and step sons at the same age level do not share these same interests, and there is no difference in the likelihood that a step father will kill his step son versus the step son killing his stepfather. Thus the difference between biological and step fathers and sons could not be attributed to differences in physical force or emotional control.

Reciprocity – cooperation, justice.

Although Darwin attributed the origins of moral behaviors and feelings to relationships between relatives, he recognized that different animals (like dogs and monkeys) sometimes show these behaviors and feelings toward non-relatives and even toward members of other species. He attributed this to the advantages of reciprocity.

In the past few decades researchers have dedicated a great deal of attention to this question (Axelrod 1984; Ridley 1996; Alexander 1987). Many of these scholars have degrees in economics and have used models from this discipline (like game-theory) to clarify when reciprocity could be adaptive. Much attention has been dedicated to the “prisoner’s dilemma.” In this game participants need to decide whether to cooperate or not. Resources are distributed so that mutual cooperation results in the greatest total gains (let’s say 5 points for each player – 10 overall). If an individual cheats the other player, he may personally gain more (say 6 points), but the total gain will decrease (say 9 -- the other player receiving only 3 points). If both cheat the gain is even less (say 2 points each). Through computer simulations researchers have attempted to invent rules that would dictate whether a player should cooperate or cheat in order to maximize his personal gain. Championships have been organized to see who discovers the best rules. Depending on the original assumptions (for example the ability to remember how other players acted in the past) the optimum rules may change. For example, when groups are very large, those who do not cooperate gain more points; in smaller groups cooperators do better. If it is possible to “drop out” of the game and remain alone, eventually joining with other solitaries in smaller groups, the system may vacillate, at times favoring cooperators, at times defectors (Hauert, Monte, Hobbauer and Sigmund 2002). Also the possibility of punishing non-cooperators increases cooperation. The presence of altruistic punishers (who punish without gaining anything thereby) in small groups makes cooperation more viable than the presence of altruistic cooperators in large groups (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson 2003). 

These simulations help clarify what different theories predict in terms of reciprocity, but do not provide data with respect to what actually occurs. Other researchers, principally from psychology (or “experimental economics”), have carried out experiments in order to discover how animals and humans really act. Their research shows that what humans (and animals) actually do is somewhat out of step with the theories. For example, a series of studies on this theme has been carried out in 15 small-scale societies, including foraging societies like the Hadza of East Africa, extensive agriculturalists like the Aché or Machiguenga Indians in South America, and other non-Western societies like Mongolians or Zimbabweans. In these studies, individuals participated in a game in which a given quantity of money was shown to two players (whose identities were hidden in order to guarantee anonymity). The first player had the option of keeping all of the money or giving part to a second player. If the second player accepted the proposal the money was divided according to the proposal and the game ended. According to the “homo economicus” theory, the first player should not offer very much, and the second player should accept any offer whatsoever. In this way each would be caring for his or her own economic interests. But in all of the societies studied the second player refused proposals considered “unjust”, preferring instead to receive nothing and punish the first player (Sigmund, Fehr and Nowak 2002; Gintis, Bowles e Fehr 2003). The authors argue that these data show that humans possess a sense of “strong reciprocity,” a kind of altruism that goes beyond what is predicted by the computer simulations. The authors suggest that this “altruistic” punitive behavior is compatible with evolution, so long as we recognize that our psychological motivations need to adapt to the pressures of natural selection, but do not need to be perfectly adapted. In the conditions of life occurring throughout the greater part of human evolution people would re-encounter the gaming partners again, and anonymous transactions would have been rare. In these situations a motivation to cooperate and feel injustice would have almost always been advantageous, independently of the situation, which is sufficient for natural selection to operate. A confirmation of the “irrationality” of human feelings regarding cooperation comes from research with similar games carried out with students (Chaudhuri, Sopher and Strand 2002). In these studies it was clear that cooperators simply had more cooperative dispositions or personalities. The fact that other players cooperated or not did not affect their behavior.

Feelings of indignation regarding behaviors considered unfair have also been observed in animals. In one experiment capuchin monkeys learned to exchange tokens for pieces of cucumber. The exchanges worked well until one monkey observed the researchers give a grape to another monkey. After observing this the first monkey refused to exchange the token for a piece of cucumber. If the first monkey saw the research give a grape to the second monkey without the need for trading tokens, the first monkey threw the token at the researcher in an apparent show of moral indignation (reported in the Economist 2003). Other researchers have observed chimpanzees to intervene in conflicts in a disinterested way, and to show more concern for the victims of aggression than for the instigators of the conflict (Flack and de Waal 2000). Although these reactions may appear “good” in the sense of preserving “justice,” indignation does not always have this effect. When a baboon or macaque receives an aggressive reaction from an animal higher up in the dominance hierarchy, the reaction is not against the aggressor, but against some innocent that just happens to be nearby (Cheney, Seyfarth and Smuts 1986). Perhaps these reactions might be explained in terms of the desire to maintain one’s position in the group’s dominance hierarchy. The monkey that is rebuked by the dominant finds itself in a precarious situation, since its subordinate status is clarified. In this situation it needs to reaffirm its superior position with regard to other individuals, which it does by attacking someone even lower in the hierarchy.

These feelings of injustice underline the value given to the respect animals receive from other group members, and the importance of dominance hierarchies.

Dominance Hierarchies – moral indignation, respect for authority, well-being

The importance Darwin gave to memory in the evolution of a moral sense is closely tied to the distinction he made between passing instincts, like hunger (which disappears as soon as it is satisfied), and long-lasting instincts (that continue always). A passing instinct may dominate a long-lasting instinct – for example, a bird’s instinct to migrate with the first signs of autumn may temporarily dominate its instinct to care for its offspring. But if the animal possesses a good memory, as soon as the passing instinct is satisfied, remorse may set in as the long-lasting instinct kicks in again. In group-living animals one of the most important long-lasting instincts is the desire for esteem and respect (Darwin 1998/1874). This desire for esteem brings us to an important aspect of group-life – dominance hierarchies. These hierarchies exist in all animals that live in groups and that recognize individuals rather than just categories (like “worker bee”) (Wilson 1980). Social living requires adjustments to behavior to deal with these hierarchies. For example, Thomas (1993) noted that dogs spend a good deal of time evaluating the relative status of each other. Doubts about status lead to fights, but once hierarchies are established animals are able to live in relative peace (like “department colleagues” to use the author’s analogy). But it seems there are some more tacit rules. For example, dominant dog have more rights to have puppies, while lower status dogs become nervous during pregnancy and dedicate less attention to their offspring, apparently due to fear of the dominants. Based on his studies with various primates, de Waal (1991) describes how animals manage to maintain peace through rituals of reconciliation that follow status fights, and confirm the acceptance of inequalities. Many of the rituals involve sexual activities (for example, one animal mounts another). Looking at data from various primates Werner (1998) argued that cooperation passed through various evolutionary states. The most simple cooperation consists simply in marking territories, which establishes rules of conduct (staying out of another’s territory implies peace). Where cooperation is greater and different animals share a common territory, a small modification occurs in the ritualization – the scents used to mark territories are now use to mark dominant and submissive roles (the submissive is marked by the dominant’s smell and is obliged to “pay homage” to the dominant by smelling its scents. Where cooperation becomes even more complex and animals form alliances to be able to dominate together, the territorial/dominance markers are co-opted to mark alliances – that is, allies exchange roles (and smells) to symbolize their willingness at times to submit to their partner.

It seems natural selection follows a simple rule: “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”. In the complexification that occurred throughout evolution from unicellular to larger organisms the smaller parts change little. This is why living beings are most similar at the level of their DNA or RNA (all have DNA or RNA), and less similar at the level of cells. Cells are more similar than tissues, and tissues more similar than organs or larger structures. (One example is the molecules like hormones and neurotransmitters that serve as messengers in the body. These molecules are very similar to the molecules that serve as external messengers in simple organisms like slime molds (Bonner 1988)). In the case of behavior and cognition the same phenomenon seems to occur. For example, more abstract human symbols are based on more basic concepts that we share with other animals. Word etymologies illustrate well this process. The case of human status markers is illustrative. Consider only the most basic (and profane) words we use to describe someone who is overly submissive to his boss.

Thomas’s observation about peace among dogs with stable hierarchies resembling social relations among department colleagues may be more than just analogy. Indeed, de Waal (1991) suggests that the acceptance of hierarchies is essential to the maintenance of peace and union. Hierarchical changes cause conflicts. De Waal even suggested that the catholic church was able to maintain unity longer than protestant churches exactly because of the greater stability of its hierarchies. The impact of unstable human hierarchies was observed in a series of experiments by Mendes (1997). In one of these experiments male students received randomly one of two versions of a short comic strip story. The basic story was of a new prisoner being introduced to a prison colleague, and students were asked to complete the story. A total of 68.5% of the students who received stories with unstable personal hierarchies (with many changes of cellmates) completed the story with a rape scene (instead of friendship), while only 26.7% of those who received stories of stable personal hierarchies gave this response. Mendes suggested that where hierarchies are stable there is no need to clarify them all the time. But when one’s hierarchical position is less clear, it becomes necessary to clarify dominance via homosexual relationships in which the “active” partner affirms his dominance over the “passive” partner. In another study Silva (1998) interviewed prisoners regarding their attitudes with respect to raping other prisoners as a form of punishment. Silva discovered that, independently of the question of access to women for sex, it was those who expressed most concern about their status in the dominance hierarchies who most approved of raping other prisoners. It’s worth noting that prisoners normally justified rape as a way to protect the honor of the family and of women, since most rapes occurred against those condemned for rape. But it was not the prisoners preoccupied with the situation of families or women who most approved of rape as punishment. Their moral indignation was more closely related to problems of honor and personal esteem.

The link between moral indignation and status is shown also in studies on the feeling of being treated unfairly. In a review of the literature, Miller (2001) cited various studies showing that this feeling is closely related to having felt disrespect. For example, in judicial procedures regarding child custody, men almost always lose, but it is the feeling of not having been adequately listened to by the judge that best explained their sense of indignation. By the same token, the tendency to sue a doctor is more closely related to the perception of having been treated with disrespect than to the merits of the case itself. Miller argues that feelings of injustice are more closely related to judicial proceedings than to results. But even if we accept this explanation the problem of status continues. Citing Rawls (1971), Miller argues that procedural justice is considered more important than distributive justice precisely because it is in the judicial procedure that individuals receive one of the things they most deserve – “the right to be treated in a way that promotes self-esteem.”

In any case, other studies cited by Miller (2001) show a close relationship between anger and feelings of injustice. Many times it is anger that provokes feelings of injustice and not the other way around. In another literature review Eisenberg (2000) observed that children with more aggressive personalities tend to externalize their emotions, and to blame others in cases of conflict. More fearful children tend to internalize emotions and are more likely to feel guilt themselves. As Miller (2001) observed, one of the things that most provokes anger is insult, and studies both of humans and animals (Miller cites de Waal here) show that retaliation serves principally to preserve the image of honor. Even when retaliation serves to “teach a lesson,” this lesson often consists in reinforcing the lower status or moral worth of the other.

Intellectual Capacities – confusion between what is and what ought to be

In a comparison of different primate species Byrne (1995) found a strong correlation between the neocortex index (weight of the neocortex divided by the brain’s total weight), and the size of social groupings. Since this index is also closely correlated with the capacity of different species to cheat, Byrne suggests that human intelligence results from an “arms race” throughout evolution between the capacity to cheat and the capacity to detect cheaters. It is this “Maquiavellian intelligence” (Byrne and Whiten 1988) that is behind most of our intellectual capacities. Elsewhere (Werner 1987) I summed up studies by different researchers (Cosmides 1989; Gigerenzer and Hug 1992; Politzer e Nguyen-Xuan 1992) that shows that our capacity for logical reasoning is closely related to the ability to detect cheaters. That is, we solve logical problems much more easily when they are presented in a way that provokes suspicion of cheating. It seems we want to know not only if a proposition is “true” or “false”, but also whether the person who presents the proposition is “true” or “false.” Indeed, according to these researchers, our very sense of “true” or “false” (“right” or “wrong”) evolved from this social phenomenon. No wonder, then, that we have such a strong tendency to confuse what “is” with what “ought to be,” or “explanations” with “justifications” or “causes” with “blame.” If our sense of “right” or “wrong” is closely related to our ability to detect contradictions in the behavior of others (in order to detect cheats), it is to be expected that people will have different capacities for detecting “right” or “wrong.” Indeed, psychology has a long tradition of examining differences in the development of moral reasoning. The theories of Piaget and Kohlberg on moral reasoning have been confirmed in dozens of studies from different cultures around the world (e.g. Boyes and Walker 1988). Links between moral reasoning, general intelligence and moral behavior have been confirmed by some studies. For example, Eisenberg (2000) reviewed studies that showed that children and adolescents with problems of concentration are more anti-social and have more problems with moral reasoning. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) also cite the role of low intelligence (when combined with other factors) in criminality. What’s at stake is the capacity for moral reasoning and not moral feelings. No one argues that high intelligence alone prevents criminality (indeed the ability to cheat increases with intelligence), nor that low intelligence alone leads to immoral behavior. But differences in the capacity for moral reasoning should alert us to a basic problem in our legislation – that an individual can be considered guilty of his/her acts so long as he or she is able to recognize the difference between “right” and “wrong.” When we must deal with different degrees of moral reasoning this principle ceases to work.

 Many debates have arisen with respect to the schemes of Piaget and Kohlberg, but most critiques deal with the criteria used to evaluate morality, and not with the discoveries about moral reasoning itself. For example, Gilligan and Attanucci (1988) distinguish between “orientations for justice” which are measured by Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning, and “orientations for care,” which are measured by arguments about the needs of others, and are more typical of women. It is not possible to conclude that one orientation is better than the other. From the point of view of the evolutionary theories presented here, these differences have to do with the type of group we are dealing with.

Moral Orientations for different types of group

Comparing the behavior of chimpanzees with humans de Waal (1991) suggests that there are basic differences in the groups of males and females. Males typically associate in larger groups where hierarchies are more marked and more voluble. Male coalitions “are instruments to achieve and maintain high status. There is little room for sympathy or antipathy among such opportunistic strategists” (de Waal 1991, pg. 51). Males are always fighting and reconciling. De Waal cites the example of Brazil’s 1984 presidential winner, Tancredo Neves, to illustrate this among humans. Neves commented once that “I have never had a friend from who I could not separate, and never had an enemy that I could not approach.” In contrast, females are generally restricted to smaller groups where hierarchies are more informal. In his research with chimpanzees de Waal noted that alliances among females were longer-lasting and animosities more irreconcilable. These differences might explain the different moral orientations of women and men observed by Gilligan and her associates. Sympathy and concern about the necessities of others would be more adaptive to social life in smaller groups (especially among close relatives). Although Gilligan claimed Kohlberg’s stages were oriented toward “justice,” I think it would be more correct to call this moral reasoning, since “justice” is not necessarily the principle behind his scheme. The basic idea of Kohlberg is that as a child matures it able to distinguish better its own world from the world of others and to reason according to the necessities of an ever larger world. From the point of view of the theories presented here, moral reasoning (derived from the ability to detect cheating) would be more adaptive in larger groups characterized by reciprocity and dominance hierarchies. In a study relating moral orientation to personality characteristics in men and women Ashton, Paunonen, Holmes and Jackson (1998) found support for this argument, and clarify that personality traits like “emotional stability” and the “capacity for forgiveness” are more related to “reciprocal altruism,” while “empathy” and attachment” are more related to “kinship altruism.”

Implications for what we ought to do

I began this essay arguing that the theory of evolution alone could not tell us what we ought to do. Its usefulness consists mainly in its ability to generate new ideas that can be tested with the scientific method. But this does not mean that we cannot take advantage of these ideas to help us make decisions about what we ought to do. If we accept (for other reasons) that the basic principle of morality is “increase well-being” or “loving one’s neighbor as oneself,” then we can use research inspired by evolutionary theory (or any other ideas tested scientifically) to clarify what increases well-being. The ideas of evolutionary psychology are especially useful in clarifying human nature. If we know better how to deal with human nature we can better elaborate moral and legal systems that are appropriate to humans instead of systems more appropriate to angels or brutes. By throwing out inadequate traditional rules and replacing them with better rules we can progress in our attempts to increase well being.

For example, consider our sense of justice. We refer to our judicial system as a system of justice, which shows how deeply rooted is the idea of justice as the basis for our legal and moral systems. But one of the points of the studies cited here is precisely that we need to be careful about our sense of injustice. Many times our sense of indignation reflects more a selfish desire for self-promotion and not a desire to increase well-being. In Luther’s words we need to recognize that “a saint is someone who knows that everything he does is done for selfish reasons” (cited in Wright 1996), and we need to question if “justice” really deserves such an important role in the foundation of our moral or legal systems.

Questioning the notion of justice as the basis for law and morality is not new in history. On the contrary, it was one of the main themes of the Protestant Reformation. (I cite the Reformation, not because this theme only appeared at that time, but simply because I personally know more about it due to my own Lutheran catechism). In the essays he considered his most important (“On Good Works,” and “On the Bondage of the Will”) Luther made his opinions clear about the idea of justice. As millions of Lutheran children learn in their catechisms, “God loves us, not because of, but in spite of.” We are not saved because we deserve to be saved. We are saved simply by the Grace of God. Basing himself on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (which both Luther and Calvin considered the basis of the Reformation), Luther, like Saint Paul, argued that divine justice has nothing whatsoever to do with anything we could possibly understand as justice. God chose to save some and not others. It is an illusion to think we have a free-will when our lives are predestined by God. It is an illusion, then, to think we are being justly rewarded. As I argued elsewhere (www.redel.com.br/~dennisww) an attempt to base moral or legal systems on the notion of justice leads to problematic conceptual problems. First, different aspects of the notion of justice are contradictory with each other. For example, justice implies equality. But what kind of equality – equal assets, equal opportunity, or equal treatment in question of law? Since humans are different in their abilities and personalities, one type of equality will necessarily imply another type of inequality. Second, the notion of justice implies the idea that we should reap what we sow. But how can we reconcile this idea with the different ideas about equality? Finally a preoccupation with the idea of justice leads us to ruminate on past wrongs in an endless cycle instead of thinking about how to increase future well-being.

Instead of trying to base morality on the notion of justice, Luther, like Saint Augustine and Saint Paul before him, had recourse to the answer Jesus gave when asked what law was the most important to which all other laws are subordinate. “Love God with all your heart and all your mind and all your soul,” and its corollary “love your neighbor as yourself.” In my Lutheran catechism I learned that Luther summed this up as “Love God and do as you please.” The replacement for the idea of justice is to “increase well-being.” Many later philosophers (like Hume and Mills) developed these ideas further. Darwin simply made it clear that “well-being” is not the equivalent of happiness as some philosophers proposed. And others clarified that optimizing well-being is not the equivalent of optimizing material well-being (A large area of research today deals with the factors that predict mental and physical well-being). This does not mean that it is wrong to seek justice. It simply clarifies that if the search for justice leads to adversity instead of well-being, then it is “well-being” that should guide us.

Linked to the question of justice is the question of free-will, since without free-will we have no way to attribute responsibility or blame, and so cannot judge whether someone has been treated fairly. This is a problem for a system based on the concept of justice, but is not a problem for a system based on the principle of maximizing well-being. Luther and Calvin linked the lack of free-will to the idea of predestination – God made the choices. Many today continue to link the idea of free-will to the modern equivalent of predestination – determinism – and fear the loss of morality if we “fall” into determinism. For example Edelman (1992) seeks an escape from determinism in the search for quantum randomness within neurons. But free-will will not be saved by randomness. If cannot control cause and effect relationships, we can control randomness even less.

The major problem with free-will is not determinism – it is the difficulty in finding a “self.” For Descartes this “Self” could be found in the pineal gland. Today few would accept the idea that we can find a part of the brain that houses the “self” responsible for our decisions. Indeed, LeDoux (1996) cites research showing conflicts between deferent parts of the brain when decisions must be made. The clearest cases are of patients with epilepsy who have undergone surgery to divide the brain, and who sometimes discover that the different halves of the brain disagree about what action to take – one hand may embrace a man’s wife while the other pushes her away, for example (Ornstein 1977). What should we think then of the case of Siamese twins? Which part of the brain must be shared to conclude that we are dealing with one and not two people? Which part or function of the brain must be dead in order to conclude that the person is dead?

Fortunately, as Luther and Calvin demonstrated, we don’t need to resuscitate a free-will to develop a moral system. Judging a person’s past or his or her intentions are important only in the sense that they may help predict future behaviors. Sometimes, too, we may be able to influence someone to do good by having recourse to the illusion of free-will and the sense of responsibility many people have. But we should not overly worry ourselves about deciding whether past acts were “right” or “wrong.” The important thing is to think of how to better the future. For example, punishment is only valid to the extent that it corrects the behavior of the accused or serves as a deterrent to others. In and of itself, “just retribution” is unimportant. It may be necessary to take dangerous people off the streets, but it is useless to punish them if this does not better future behaviors (and in the case of many crimes, punishment has little effect) (Paez de Gigena 1989). It would be better to attempt to increase well-being for these people at the same time that we increase our control over them (cf. Wooyton 1959). Freedom is not the equivalent of well-being, and its lack does not necessarily mean adversity (for example curtailing one’s freedom to commit suicide). As the world becomes ever more complex we need to recognize that concepts like freedom, well-being and justice do not always imply each other. What we need to do is clarify for different individuals and different situations exactly which rules or laws maximize well-being and be careful about demagogic discourses. Research inspired in evolutionary theory may help us clarify these questions.

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