What Makes Something Wrong? What Makes Something Sick?
There once was a time when scholars believed in the fundamental unity of "Truth," "Beauty," and "Goodness." This meant that by studying nature more closely (arriving closer to the "truth") we could clarify moral issues. In the words of Emerson, "Sensible objects conform to the premonitions of reason and reflect the conscience. All things are moral . . . every animal function from the sponge up to Hercules, shall hint or thunder to man the laws of right and wrong, and echo the Ten Commandments. Therefore is nature ever the ally of Religion: lends all her pomp and riches to the religious sentiment."
But the more scientists study nature, the less moral it appears. Only a De Sade could find virtue in the many cruelties of nature. So we cannot draw conclusions about what "ought to be" directly from what "is". Of course many people still try to deduce "ought" from "is" and vice versa. But their deductions are considered fallacies in reasoning by most thinkers. First there is the naturalistic fallacy, in which people conclude that, if something is "natural," then it must be "good". Then there is the relativistic fallacy, in which people conclude that, if in a given culture, people think that something is good, then we must consider it to be "good." Finally there is the moralistic fallacy, in which people conclude that if something "ought to be", then it, in fact, "is". An example of the moralistic fallacy would be to judge that women and men "ought to be" psychologically alike, and deduce from this that any study that finds psychological differences must be factually wrong.
We are so anxious to find something to base our morality on that some scientists still try to find a "natural" basis for morality. For example, every once in a while someone suggests that traits that are biologically "adaptive" must be morally "good." But some adaptive behaviors could hardly be considered virtuous by most standards (for example, killing another male’s offspring is sometimes adaptive). Others may try to argue that our "natural" (inborn, instinctive) sense of morality must, in fact, be "good." But these ideas are still just variations on the naturalistic fallacy. For example, our "instinctive" notions of justice are sometimes self-serving. Moral indignation often simply justifies our own selfish interests.
What can we base our moral decisions on? No one has a final answer here, and probably never will. But there are a few principles that many believe can serve as guides. Perhaps we can find a general principle that all in fact agree might work, without leading to contradictions. My preference is for the utilitarian’s principle of "greatest well-being" for the "greatest number". Of course it’s not easy to define "well-being", and we may not even be sure about who to include in the "greatest number" (what species should we include, for example). But when talking about specific cases we usually agree on what we mean. Most research shows that different notions of physical and subjective well-being correlate well with each other, even if the factors that lead to well-being may vary widely from person to person.
If we accept a principle such as "well-being" to guide our moral decisions, then we can, in fact, use science to help us make moral decisions. We can try to discover, for example, just what factors lead to greater well being among different people.
What Defines Illness / Pathology?
This leads us to another question about "is" and "ought." Psychiatrists sometimes find it "paradoxical" that they can define fairly precisely phenomena like "bipolar syndrome," "chronic depression," of "sociopathy." But they can’t define "mental illness." Actually, there is no paradox here. The precise definitions are simply clarifying what "is," while the label "illness" refers to what "ought" not to be. Again, we cannot make direct deductions from science about what "ought" or what "ought not" to be. We must use some other criterion (like well-being) to define "illness." This means that finding that something is caused by a gene, or by an infectious agent, or by a certain childhood experience, tells us nothing about whether we are dealing with an "illness" or "pathology". For example, many infectious agents are useful to us, by helping us digest food, etc. Nor does the finding that something is evolutionarily "maladaptive" tell us anything about what "ought" to be. Just as something that is adaptive may be morally repugnant, so may something that is maladaptive be morally laudable - for example, sacrificing one’s life for a stranger.
Of course science helps us tremendously in dealing with illness by showing us what causes phenomena we consider (for other reasons) to be "pathological." But, science cannot define illness.
Humans are tremendously interested in what "ought to be", so that they can make daily decisions. Journalists must cater to this interest, but please do so with a little care. Don’t confuse "is" with "ought".